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VoI.. XV. FEBRUARY, 1917 No4. 
THE EXTENSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW YORK: 
1783-1905. 
T HERE are several reasons why it should be worth while to investigate the operation of the most unique of American 
governmental institutions in the most important state of the 
Union. For one thing, in the person of Chancellor KENT New 
York furnished one of the founders of American Constitutional 
Law, while at the same time it was KENT's fame that early gave 
New York decisions the importance they still retain in great part 
in the field of citation, and precedent. Again it was KENT'S influ-
ence that inclined the fresh shoot of constitutional jurisprudence in 
New York in a conservative direction, so that in the face of the 
most complex social and economic conditions that obtain anywhere 
in the Union, the New York courts have ordinarily pressed those 
doctrines of constitutional law :which have for their purpose the 
security of property rights more vigorously than the courts of 
almost any other jurisdiction. But on the other hand, finally, with 
respect to her written constitution New York has had a normal and 
representative history, having had, since 1777, four successive con-
stitutions, each of which has progressively stimulated the extension 
of judicial review by increased and more detailed inhibitions upon 
legislative action. 
l. STATISTICS OF JUDICIAI, REVIEW IN NEW YORK. 
The list which I print below1 of cases wherein New York courts 
have exercised their constitutional function is based primarily upon 
data furnished in the fourth and fifth volumes of LINCOLN'S CoN-
STITUTIONAI, HISTORY o:F NEW YoRK, extended and corrected by 
direct examination of the reports themselves. The preparation of 
such a list raises certain problems, the solution of which will 
1 For this list of cases see post pp. 306·313. 
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necessarily affect the significance of the results to be obtained from 
their consideration, and which, therefore, should be stated at the 
outset Should, for example, the decisions of lower courts be 
counted or only those of the highest court? Clearly, since there is 
often no legal provision by which the constitutional question can be 
appealed to the highest court, one must count all decisions which 
were in fact final. But suppose that a lower court's pronouncement 
of unconstitutionality upon a legislative provision is in principle 
reversed in a later case decided by the highest court? 1 still 
list the lower court's decision but specifically note that it was 
finally overruled,-a result which, however, registers itself in 
only six cases.2 And this anticipates, in effect, my answer to 
a related question, to-wit: whether, wh,ere a number of decisions 
occur more or less contemporaneously and all bearing on the 
same legislative measure, they should be reckoned as only 
one decision or for their total number. Since it is decisions we 
are dealing with primarily, I reckon each as one, provided it was 
final, but at the same time I have kept careful account of all cases 
of this. sort of duplication.8 Lastly, this most important question 
presents itself : Should decisions setting aside legislative provisions 
alone be counted, or also those construing such provisions, with a 
view to bringing them into harmony with constitutional require-
ments? Now, most of the latter sort of cases illustrate the rule 
laid down in the early case of Dash v. Van Kleeck, that a statute 
may not validly operate "retrospectively" to the impairment of 
vested rights,-indeed some of the most important decisions in 
support of the doctrine of Vested Rights rest upon this principle. 
I have accordingly felt no hesitation in reckoning such .cases, which 
I indicate in the list below by an asterisk, as true constitutional' 
cases if the language of the court itself iridicates the fact that the 
statute was being curtailed in deference to some right thought 
to be protected by the constitution. For in sue~ cases, it is obvious, 
the constitutional function of the judiciary has operation as truly, 
and frequently as decisively, as in cases where the statute is pro-
nounced void a outrance. 
These considerations set forth, I may proceed to summarize the 
results shown by the list given below. The list runs from I/'?3 to r905,, 
a little better than one hundred and twenty years, and from Rutgers 
v. Waddingtoti, in which HAMII.'£ON won his spurs, to Wright v. 
Hart, in which the Court of Appeals, going counter to the weight 
of-· decision in other states, on the constitutional issue involved, held 
2 Nos. 30, 6o, 77, 78, 93•, 145•. 
•Attention is drawn to the fact in the text, when it is· materiaL 
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void the Bulk Sales Act of 1902.4 In this list are cited 363 cases. 
In six of these the decision was in principle later overruled by a 
higher court.5 In thirty-one, the great majority of which oc-
curred before the Civil War, the legislative measure involved was 
construed but not avowedly set aside. In fifty-seven the decisions 
involved the same legislative provision or provisions as some previ-
ous case, though it was not r~ted necessarily on the sruiie constitu-
tional grounds as its fellow}' In a number of cases not particularly 
noted more than one enactment was under review, while in a 
number of others the decision was based on more than one con-
stitutional provision or principle. 
More striking results emerge when we proceed to classify these 
363 cases chronologically. Thus we find that for more than a 
generation after Rutgers v. Waddington, no act of the legislature was 
pronounced void by a New York court, and that for more than a 
quarter-century none was eyen construed. Indeed, not till l8o2 
was a statute attacked by counsel at bar as void, and it was seven 
years before such an argument was again addressed to a New York 
court. For the whole period of forty-five years during which the 
constitution of 1777 was in effect eleven constitutional cases were 
decided by the New York courts; in three the statute assailed was 
sustained; in three it was curtailed in such a way as not to govern 
the case ; in the remaining five it was pronounced void. 7 
' 
•See Lemieux v. Young, 2n U. S. 48g (1909), and cases there cited. 
1 See note 2, supra. 
•The following groups of cases involve each the same act or acts: II and 31; 
19 and 21; 23 and 24; 27, 29, 33•, 44 and 48--the :Married Women's Property kt 
of 1848; 34, 39 and 41-the Free School Act; 35 and 49; 37 and 37•; 45 and 47: SI 
and 54-the Anti-Liquor Act of 1855; 61, 64 and 65; 69 and So; '17 and 78; 87, 92, 121 
and 122; 115 and 123; 127 and 215; 140 and 741; 153 and 154; 158• and 182; 159 and 
242; 161 and 199; 16~ and 214; 165 and 166; 188 and 196; 191 and 792; 193 and 298, 
involving the same parties; 193• and 197; 201, 202, 203 · and 212; 245 and 246; 250, 
251, 252 :ind 254; 253, 256, 257 and 293; :z66 and 286; 267 and :a74; 269, 279 and 284; 
272 and 287; 277, 278 and 327; 277• and 296"; 281 and 294; 290, 309 and 326; 310 
and 3n; 322, 323 and 332. • 
'The following is a list of the cases in which, during the period covered by the 
first two conetitutions, acts of the legislature were unsuccessfully challenged before New 
York courts. After 1846 such case~ become too numerous to list here, but the cita· 
tions given in the fourth volume of Lincoln are nearly enough complete, l believe, to 
show the approximate truth: 
18o7: ·x Holmes v. Lansing, 3 Johns. Cas. 73. 
l8o9: 2 Jackson v. Griswold, s Johns. 139· 
1812: 3 Livingston v. Van lngen, 9 ib. 506. 
1819: 4 Mather v. Bush 16 ib. 233. 
1821: s People v. Foot, lg ib. 58. 
1823: 6 Re Oaths of Attorneys, 20 ib. 492; 
6• Rogers v. Bradshaw, ib. 735, overturning Bradshaw v. Rogers, ib. 103; 
7 ~x parte :McCollum, l Cow. 550. 
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The small number of constitutional cases under this first con-
stitution is referred by LINCOLN to the fact that under it "the 
Council of Revision, composed of the Governor, the Chancellor, and 
the judges of the Supreme Court, passed on all bills before they 
became laws," with the result that "laws received a judicial con-
struction prior to their enactment."8 The ~xplanation is at best very 
imperfect. The factors of judicial review are three-fold: first, 
the bulk of the legislative product; secondly, the scope of the prin-
ciples which the judges themselves have developed for the evalua-
tion of this product; thirdly, the number and detail of the provisions 
in the written constitution restrictive of legislative power. Anterior 
to the constitution of I82I, the annual legislative grist in New York 
was still small; the courts had not yet perfected the doctrine of Vested 
Rights, which with its various ramifications and derivatives is still 
1824: 8 Murphy v. People, 2 ib. Bxs; 
9 Jackson v. Wood, ib. 8x9; 
IO Barker v. People, 3 ib. 686. 
1825: II No. R. S. B. Co. v. Livingston, ib. 713; 
xz People ex rel. Israel v. Tibbets, 4 ib. 38+ 
1826: x3 Jaques v. Marquand, 6 ib. 497. 
1827: I4 Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 ib. 349; 
15 Coates v. N. Y., ib. 585. 
1828: x6 Lansing v. Smith, 8 ib. x46; 
x7 Candler v. N. Y., I Wend. 493. 
1829: xS Bank of Columbia v. Att'y Gen'l, 3 ib. 588. 
1830: I9 Wheelock v. Young, 4 ib. 647. 
1831: 20 Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., .3 Paige 45. 
1833: 21 Re Smith, IO Wend. 449. 
1836: 22 People v. Rensselaer & S. R. Co., IS Wend. u3. 
1837: 23 Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R. Co., 14 ib. 52, and xB ib. 9; 
24 Frost v. Brisbin, 19 ib. I I. 
1838: 25 Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige 77; 
26 Cochran v. Van Sur!ay, 20 Wend. 365. 
1839: 27 Perrine v. Striker, 7 Paige 598; 
28 People v. Morrell, 2I Wend. 563. 
1840: 29 Thomas v. Leland, 24 ib. 65. 
1841: 30 Butler v. Palmer, I Hill 324; 
31 People v. Jenkins, ib. 46g; 
. 32 People ex reL Lynch v. N. Y., 25 Wend. 68o; 
33 Ex parte Lynch, 2 Hill 45. 
1842: 34 Welch v. Silliman, ib. 49I ; 
35 Colt v. People, I Park. Crim. 6II. 
1843: 36 Foote v. N. Y. Fire :Qept., s Hill 99. 
37 Duffy v. People, I ib. 355, and 6 ib. 75. 
1845: 38 Ingersoll v. Skinner, I Denio 540; 
39 Striker v. Kelly, 2 ib. 323; 
40 Gifford v. Livingston, ib. 38o; 
41 Russell v. N. Y., ib. 46x. 
·• .1846: 42 Stocking v. Hunt, 3 ib. 274; 
43 Morris v. People, ib. 38x ; 
44 People v. Huntington, 4 N. Y. Legal Observer 187. 
•Loe. cit. V, + 
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the principal foundation of judicial review; and the provisions of 
the written constitution directly restricting legislative power were 
few. There was, in short, little judicial review because there was 
little to base it upon. 
From this point on the results may be summarized by decades. 
From 1822 to 1830 inclusive, sixteen cases appear to have been 
argued before New York courts on constitutional grounds, but in 
only one of these was the statute brought into review overturned, 
while in a second it was curtailed by construction. From 1831 to 
1840 inclusive, fourteen such cases were argued, in four of which 
the result was adverse to the statute. From 1841 to 1850 there is· 
a considerable expansion of judicial review, due in part to the going 
into effect of the constitution of 1846, but in greater part to conflict 
between the conservative principles of the courts and the refonn 
tendencies of legislation, a conflict which also characterizes the 
ensuing decade.9 Thus for the decade from 1841 to 1850, I find 
fifty-eight constitutional cases, in eighteen of which the decision 
was rendered in favor of the party claiming his constitutional rights ; 
while for the decade from 1851 to 1860, the figures are respectively 
127 and 34. For the remaining periods I am less confident of th~ 
accuracy of my statistics show.ing the number of cases argued, ·which 
should therefore be taken as approximate only: 
Period 
1861-70 ........ . 
1871-So ••...•... 
1881-90 ......... . 




Number of Cases Ar-







I 345 (Approx.) 
Number of these in 
which Acts were set 







In short, before the outbreak of the Civil War 225 cases had been 
argued before New York courts on constitutional grounds, in sixty-
five of which the court had intervened against the statute; while 
since that date more than uoo such cases have been so argued, in 
nearly 300 of which _statutes have been set aside. Nor is this the 
only clue that the above statistics furnish to the extension of judicial 
review in New York in recent years. Of equal significance is the 
•See J. Bronson's sarcastic language in Stockton v. Green, 3 Hill 469 (1841). Com· 
pare the same justice's ardent defense of the Property Right in Sackett v. Andross, 
s ib. 327 (1843). 
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varying ratio between the number of cases argued and those in 
which the statutory provision under review succumbed to consti-
tutional tests. Ignoring the few sporadic cases before 1822, we 
notice that in the nine years between this date and 1830, this ratio 
is 8 to I ; that. in the four succeeding decades it shrinks to approxi-
mately 3Yz to I; that from 1871 to 1880 it rises to 5 5/9 to I, where 
it remains approximately till 189<>; that since this last date it has 
fallen to less than 3 to I. The explanation is to be found, I surmise, 
in the expansion of constitutional doctrine. 
Moreover, the same result is indicated in another way. If the 
dates of the cases be compared with the dates at which the legisla-
tive provisions reviewed in them were enacted, it will be found that 
in recent years the period betwe~ the two is usually somewhat 
less than three years. Early cases, on the other hand, arose, on the 
average, eight or ten years after the passage of the statute attacked, 
and not infrequently the interval was much greater. The explanation 
of this phenomenon is to be found, in part at least, in the fact that, 
as new constitutional doctrine developed, statutes that had frequent-
ly stood on the books for years unchallenged became. tainted with 
doubt as to their validity,-that with the lapse of time, new and 
more rigorous standards were dr~wn in!o use.10 
II. INTERPrun'ATION OF THE W.RITTEN CONSTITUTION. 
As I have before noted, the multiplication in its constitution of 
specific prohibitions on legislative power has been one of the prin-
cipal factors of the extension of judicial review in New :York. I 
shall now consider the matter a little more in detail, prefacing only. 
that, in what I shall say in this connection, I leave entirely out of 
account the doctrine of Vested Rights and its derivatives. · 
A single decision overturning a statute is referable to the consti-
tution of 1777,11 and but six such decisions to the constitution of 
1821.12 Under the constitution of 1846, on the other hand, and the 
amendments added to it in 1874 and 1876, 108 decisions of this 
character were rendered, involving at least one hundred statutory 
provisions; while to the constitution of 1894 sixty-eight such· de-
cisions are to be credited in little over a decade, albeit sixteen of 
these are to be reckoned as duplicates of others as to the measures 
reviewed. 
'''010 In this conncctfon, see the interesting testimony of Jnstice Chase in Cooper. T. 
'relfair, 4 Dall 13 (1800). 
11 No. 7 in Note l, supra. This is always the list referred to in the following notelio 
12 Nos. lo, 16, 19, 20, :u, 52. 
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But it should also be interesting to see what specific provisions, 
particularly of the last two constitutions, have been of greatest im-
portance in this connection. Two stand out preeminent: Article III, 
§ § 16 and 18, both of which were carried over to the present con-
stitution from the amended constitution of 1846 without substantial 
.change. Under the former of these provisions, which ordains that 
"''no private or loc;al bill * * * shall embrace more than one sub-
ject" which must be "expressed in the title,'' thirty-fore cases have 
been decided overturning thirty-four legislative measures ;13 and 
under the latter, which ·inhibits certain types of special legislation 
altogether, seventeen cases overturning sixteen measures.14 The 
obvious purpose of these provisions is to prevent log-rolling, and in 
no other connection has judicial review proved of greater practical 
value in New York than in stringently enforcing them!15 Nor is 
the objection forthcoming in this sort of case that some great legis-
lative policy, touching important social interests, has been rendered 
impossible. The measures overturned under these provisions are 
.ordinarily of very limited application, and when they. succumb to 
the constitutional test it is not because they were beyond the legisla-
tive power to enact at all but merely because they were beyond the 
legislative power to enact in that form,-for even the objective of 
prohibited special acts may be obtained, if it is otherwise constitu-
tional, by general legislation. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
legislature has gradually learned to accommodate itself to the judicial 
view of these; sections, so that, of the fifty-two cases just ref erred 
to, only twelve were decided under the constitution of 1894 
Next to these two sections the most prolific source of ,decisions 
invalidating legislation have been the constitutional provisions which, 
beginning with the instrument of 1846, have defined the judicial 
system of the state and have assigned the several courts their juris-
diction. Under these sections, which were amplified by amendment 
in 186g, and in this f~nn are continued in Article VI of th~ present 
.constitution, there have been, during the period covered by this 
article, forty-two decisions,--eleven of them d~plicates as to the 
enactments reviewed-invalidating acts. The majority of these in-
u Under the constitution of 1846, Nos. 55, 70•, 74, 84, S6, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 
99, 109, 125, 126, 127, 135. 137. 148, 149. 155. 158, 162, 170, 178, 185, 215, 
216; under the constitution of 1894, to 1905, Nos. 220, 231, 262, 273, 302•, 324, 333•. 
1' Under the constitution of 1846, as amended in 1874, Nos. 138, 144, 153, 154, 164, 
168, 16!), 177, 179, 180, 184•, 213; under the later constitution, to 1905, Nos • .z22, 231, 
'247, 289, 297. 
15 Some courts regard such provisions as directed only to the conscience of the 
legislature, see Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, p. 147ff. 
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voke the principle of construction which is made familiar by Mar-
bury v. Madison, that jurisdiction bestowed by the constitution is 
neither to be enlarged nor diminished by statute.16 Four decisions-
involving two different legislative provisions-call into use the 
equally familiar principle that a court is possessed of certain inherent 
powers and a certain inherent discretion that may not be invaded 
by the legislature.17 One decision enforces that interpretation of 
the doctrine of the Separation of ·Powers which 'vas first brought 
forward in the famous H aybiern case of I792, and which pronounces 
void any attempt to foist administrative powers upon the judiciary.18 
Another considerable class of decisions-twenty-four in number-
safeguard the rights of localities in the choice of their officials from 
what would appear in most cases to have been inadvertent trespasses· 
by the legislature.19 With these may be grouped five other decisions, 
under the constitution of I846, and involving two distinct enact-
ments, which assert the principle that the qualifications stipulated by 
the constitution for voters may not be added to by statute.20 And 
with similar logic three other eases support the principle that the 
oath of office prescribed by the constitution is an exclusive test.21 
Thus we gather that when the constitution deals with a subject, such 
subject is put definitely beyond the reach of direct legislative action, 
although it may be still more or less affected by legislation regulative 
of matters. within legislative control; and the problem before the 
courts is to draw the line between these two classes of enactments. 
The personal rights-in co.ntradistinction to political rights-that 
have exacted the greatest ingenuity from the New York courts in 
their behalf are those which I shall consider presently in connec-
tion With the development of the doctrine of Vested Rights in this 
14 In No. 33, the act overturned . was held to confer judicial power upon a non· 
constitutional court. In the following cases the legislature was held to have attempted 
to enlarge the territorial jurisdiction 0£ local courts unconstitutionally: us, 123, 146, 194, 
2II ; 224, 227 and 228, all involving the same act; 239; 250, 251 and 252, involving the 
same act. In 129, 163, 193a, 1971 214, 2711 272 and 2871 jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court was held to have been curtailed unconstitutionally. In 165 and 1661 both in· 
volving the same act, certain appeals to the Court of Common Pleas were held 'to have 
been wrongly dispensed with. 
1f No. 186; and Nos. 322, 323 and 3321 all involving the same act. 
11 No. 200. Compare In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67, where it is said that powers 
administrative. in character become judicial· powers when conferred on a court. See 
also United States v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576 • 
.. Nos. ssa, 69, 8o, 83, 85, 104, III, II6, us, 152•, 156, 232, 235, 236, 240, 258, 264, 
282, 302, 303, 305, 3ua, 330, 333. Article VI, § 17, and Article X, § § 2 and 5, of 
both constitutions, and Article XII, § 3 of the later one. 
~.,..,No. 89; and Nos. 201, 202, 203 and 21:z, all involving the same act. Article II, 
§ I of the constitution of 1846. 
n Nos. 205, 296, 307. Article XII, § 1 of the amended constitution of 1846, and 
article XIII of the present constitution. 
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state. But outside this field, though at some points tangent to it,. 
there is that field of rights which may be called the rights of per-
sonal security and which is safeguarded by certain constitutional re-
quirements as to the procedure of law enforcement. One of these 
requirements is that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself" ; under this clause three cases 
have been decided setting aside as many acts.22 Another require-
ment is that "excessive bail shall not be required"·; under this one 
such case has been decided.23 Another requirement is that "the trial 
by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofqre use<j, shall re-
main inviolate forever"; to this provision eiglit constitutional de-
cisions are referable, though three of them concerned the.same act.241 · 
Finally there is" the general requirement of "due process of law,'" 
which, taken in the strictly literal sense of that method of procedure 
which was "due," has furnished the basis for eleven cases.reviewing 
adversely eight different enactments.25 
The construction that has been given the requirement, against 
excessive bail by the New York courts demands no. comment. Not 
so of the interpretation they give the "self-incrimination" clause. 
Stated in the language of one of the cases it runs thus: "No .one 
shall be compelled in any judicial or other proceeding against him-
:;elf, or upon the trial of issues between others, to disclose facts qr 
circumstances that can be used against him as admissiOn tending to 
prove his guilt or connection with any criminal offense of which 
he may then qr afterwards be charged, or the sources from which 
or the means by which evidence of its commission or of his connec-
tion with it may be obtained."26 Clearly, this is a rather consider-
able edifice for so slight a foundation. But it mast be admitted 
that the New York decisions, which in fact are comparatively re-
·cent ones, merely reiterate the accepted American doctrine on this 
'point.27 
22 Nos. 292•, 316, 321. Article I, § 6 of both constitutions. 
21 No. 50. Article I, § 5 of both constitutions. 
"'No~. 38, 58, 76, 145•, 234; 269, 279 and 284, involving the same act. Article I, I 2 
of both constitutions. 
'"Nos. 71, 73, 76; 140 and 141, involving the same act; 237, 243•, 244; 322, 323 
and 332, involving the same act. 
00 People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219 (1894). The rule is" reiterated in 
People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y. ·253 (1903). See further Lincoln, toe. cit., 
IV, 78-83. 
21 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, and cases therein cited; also a note 
in Harv. Law Rev., XXIV, 570:1. In People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. n5, lo:z: 
N. E. 530 (1913), the N~w York Court of Appeals was much embarrassed by this 
enormous and overgrown doctrine. The statute before it provided that any operator 
of a motor vehicle who, knowing that injury had been caused by him to property or 
persoc, should leave the place without giving his name, residence and license number 
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Interesting questions are also raised by the interpretation given by 
the New York courts to the "trial by jury" and "due process of 
law" clauses. In the- former clause the material phrase is "all cases," 
which has been held to mean, "not the mere instances in which it 
[trial by jury] had been used," but also "such.new instances and 
like cases as might afterwards arise."28 It thus follows that, since 
felonies were triable by jury at the time of the adoption of the con-
stitution, new felonies subsequently created, since they belong to 
the same genus, must be similarly tried.29 This again is generally 
accepted American doctrine. Questionable, on the other hand, is 
the proposition for which a recent group of cases is citable, ·that, 
because certain kinds of civil claims were ordinarily tried by jury 
at the common law, the legislature may not abolish the right of action 
thereon.80 
Judiciaf construction of.the phrase "que process of law,'' in the 
class .of cases now under consideration, boils .down to the more con-
crete idea of the ordinary procedure of the ordinary courts; to the 
idea, in other words, that one against whom a claim is being made 
by the state or by· another person is entitled, unless there is usage 
to the contrary that antedates the constitutio~, to "his day in court,'' 
which means, moreover, a court possessed of its constitutional dis-, 
cretio~. Thus arbitration pf claims against a city, which in this con-
nection is treated as a private person, may not be foisted upon the 
city ;without its consent.81 So, too, an inebriate may not be com-
mitted to an asylum upon a mere e~ parte affidavit. 82 Again, there 
may be no examination out of court of a person .alleged to be in 
possession of certain property of another.88 Again, the identity of 
alleged second offenders may not be established out of court for 
the purpose of lengthening, in accordance with the law, the penal 
to the injured party or to a policeman, should be guilty of a felony. In the lower 
court this act was pronounced void under article I, § 6. The Court of Appeals, how· 
ever sustained the act on the ground that, inasmuch as the legislature might exclude all 
motor vehicles from the highways, it could insist that as a condition precedent to the 
use thereof, operators of such should waive the constitutional privilege I See also Wig· 
more, Evidence, § 2266. 
• Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378, 426 (1856). 
»The privilege extends, it is elsewhere said, to all offenses indictable 'at the common 
law, see No. 58. 
*'See Nos. 269, 279 and 284, all involving the same act. In the recent case of 
Ives v. So. Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, the same proposition is advanced, and 
a~le I, § 1 invoked in support of it. 
UNo. 71. 
aNos. 76 and 243•. 
a Nos. 140 and 141, both involving the same act. 
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sentence of such offenders.3' Again, a warrant issued by a com-
missioner has been held not to be due process ;35 also, an act re-
quiring the trial of certain kinds of civil cases on a specific day to 
be set in advance by the court.86 
These results sometimes diverge from those reached by courts in 
other states, but the logic underlying them is familiar and well es-
tablished. Likewise, the difficulty that the New York courts have 
sometimes encountered in distinguishing between a penalty and a 
remedy is one that has often caused trouble in other jurisdictions. 
Thus the common law sometimes gives ·an aggrieved party, which 
may. be the state itself, a remedy enforceable out of court by sum-
mary action. <;>n the otJier hand, a penalty may, of course, b~ 
enforced only iri court. The difficulty is to draw the line between 
the two classes of cases, and this the New York courts have not 
always done with entire consistency. So, a statute al}.owing owners 
to seize and dispose of stock that had trespassed upon their lands 
from the highway was at first overturned and then, after some un-
essential modification, sustained.31 Contrariwise,· a statute allowing 
the confiscation, by officers of the law, of fishing. nets in illegal use. 
was sustained,38 while a later statute subjecting offending 9yster-
boats to the same treatment was set aside. 39 Plainly, here is a point 
at which conclusive results have not yet been reached.'° 
.. No. 237. J. Delehanty's decision, recently reported in the press, questioning the 
validity of the identification of second offenders by the finger·mark test may have in· 
volved this point. · 
.. No. 2<14-
.. Nos. 322, 323 and 33:>, involving the same act. , 
11 The first case referred to is No. 73, Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 302 (I866). 
The amended statute wa~.sustained in Campbell v. Ev:fns, 45 'N. Y. 356 (I871). Com-
pare this decision with that in :McConnell v. Van .A:erman, 56 Barb. 334 (186sl), where 
the amended act is pronounced void. · 
aa Lawton v. Steele, u9 N. Y. 226 (I89o). 
•No. 234, Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. I88 (I8g7). 
•• The remaining cases assignable to specific constitutional provisions, other than 
those conside~ed in connection with the doctrine of Vested Ri~hts, may be claasified thus: 
Constitution of I846, art. I, I 9 (Two-thirds bills), Nos. 97, u7; § Io (Lotteries, etc.), 
Nos. 209, 2I8; art. III, I 5 (Apportionments), Nos. 59 and 72; art V, § I (Compcnsa· 
tion of certain officers, not to be increased or decreased), No. 45; art. VI, § 8 (Right 
to practice law), Nos. 23, 24; art. VII, I 3 (State canals), No. Io6; I 12 (Referendum 
of indebtedness propositions), Nos. 37, 37•; I I3 (Tax laws), No. n2; art. IX, I I 
(Common school fund inviolable), No. Io7. Amendments added in I874. art. III, § 24 
of the amended constitution (Against extra-compensation, etc.), No. I32; art. VII, § I4 
(Barring claims lapsed by statute of limitations), Nos. I72, I90; art. VIII, § IO· (Against 
gratuities and aids by local governments), No. I52. Amendment of I876, art. V, §4 of 
the amended constitution (Appointive power of superintendent of prisons), Nos. I7I, 
I76. Constitution of I894' art. III, § 28 (Against extra-compensation, etc.), No. 306; 
art. V, § 9 (Civil service examinations), Nos. 221, 230; same (Appointive power to civil 
service), No. 275; art. VIII, § IO (Against gratuities and aids by local governments), 
Nos. 238, 253, 256, 257, 26o, 292, 293; art. XII, § 2 (Referendum of special acts to city 
authorities), Nos. 243, 285. 
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III. 'tHE DOC'l'RINE 01" VES'l'ED .RIGHTS AND GENERAL 
LEGISLA'.l'IVE POWER. 
The primary purpose, however, of judicial review and its prin-
cipal effect upon legislative policies are to be seen only when we 
tum to consider it in relation to the doctrine of Vested Rights and 
those clauses of the written constlbttion which have come to embody 
this doctrine, with the result at once of extending it and rendering 
it more flexible. For, as I have shown elsewhere, the doctrine of 
Vested Rights is the very matrix of constitutional limitations in this 
country, their raison d'etre.41 In no other field, moreover, does the 
responsibility of the courts themselves for the development of 
judicial review appear so immediate and striking as in this. Yet, 
if the responsibility of the courts in this connection is immediate, 
that of society at large is mediate and very real. For the process 
of constitutional amendment has left the doctrine for the most part 
untouched; has left, in other words, its modification and adaptation 
to circumstances to judicial discretion. These are conclusions that 
hold for practically all jurisdictions in the United States, but they 
receive peculiar confirmation and emphasis from New York. 
The doctrine of Vested Rights, in its original and primitive form, 
is simply the doctrine that the property right is fundamental and 
that the legislature cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been given 
power, by the act creating it, to impair that right. But, as I have 
above indicated, the doctrine has undergone extension and develop-
ment. To indicate the principal steps of this development in New 
York, so far as it has proved restrictive of general legislative power, 
is my purpose at this point. 
The doctrine of Vested Rights may be said to have been launched 
in New York by the decision in the early case of Dash v. Van 
Kleeck,42 and especially by K~NT's opinion in that case. Here were 
established, either directly or by inference, three propositions : first, 
that an accrued right of action under tI:ie standing law is a property 
right; second, that the common Jaw rule that an ambiguous statutory 
provision should not be given a "retroactive" application in a way to 
impair vested rights, is of constitutional obligation and extends, fur-
thermore, to unambiguous as well as ambiguous provisions; third, 
that special legislation affecting detrimentally the vested rights of 
selected persons is void. The basis for the two latter propositions, 
in KEN-r's opinion at least, is furnished by the theory elaborated in 
.,, .. 
.... See Mich. Law Review, XII, 247 ff (1914). 
"7 Johns. 477 (1811). But see also Beadlestone v. Sprague, 6 ib. 101 (1810). 
Here the results of the doctrine are achieved without the doctrine being avowed,-a 
characteristic device of the courts in the early days of judicial review. 
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Justice CHASE'S dictum in Calder v. Bull,43 that, under the social 
compact, legislative power is an intrinsically limited power, and by 
an interpretation of the doctrine of the Separation of Powers sup-
porting this theory. That is to say, legislative power is, in the first 
place, a trust in the interest of certain rights, which therefore it 
may not transgress; while in the second place, the principle of the 
Separation of Powers makes it clear that it is only legislative power 
with which the legislature is constitutionally endowed. 
For many years the doctrine of Vested Rights rested in New 
Yark upon this extra-constitutional basis, and a whole ·series ·of 
decisions overturning acts invoke no provision of the written con-
stitution, but only such authority as CHASE'S above-mentioned 
dictum, a similar utterance by STORY in Wilkinson v . .Leland, and 
certain passages from KENT'S COMMENTARIES." Eventually, how-
ever, with the advance, in the late twenties and earlY. thirties, of 
the notion of Popular Sovereignty, the opinion came to prevail 
among lawyers and judges that, unless an act of the legislature could 
be shown to be incompatible with some provision of the written 
constitution, it must receive judicial enforcement.45 So, the New 
Yark courts were confronted with the dilemma of either dismissing 
the doctrine of Vested, Rights or of finding some phrase of the 
written constitution capable of. giving it shelter. I say they were 
confronted with a dilemma. Yet strictly speaking, this is a mis-
statement, since, so far as I can dis\:over, it was hardly suggested 
that the doctrine of Vested Rights should be made to walk the 
plank.46 What was really required, and all ~at was required, 
was a certain measure of ingenuity on the part of the judges 
in conforming to a new standard of decorum when overturn-
ing legislative enactments that wete thought to infract unduly 
the property right. The requisite ingenuity was forthcoming, 
but as I have told the story elsewhere in detail, I need not 
do so here.u Suffice it to say that the decision of the new 
Court of Appeals in the case of Westervelt v. Gregg,48 in 
a 3 Dall. 386 (1798). 
ff Nos. z, 3, 91 18, 26, 32, 36. But along with these should be reckoned certain 
transitional cases, in which both extra-constitutional considerations and the "due process" 
clause furnish the basis of the decision: Nos. :27, 29, 33•, 42, 44, 51. 
a See Senator Verplanck's words on this point in Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 
365 (1838). In Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232, 237 (1857), the court pronounces the 
idea that there are extra-constitutional restrictions on legislative power "fancifnl." See 
also Benson v. the Mayor, ib. 248; People v. I!raper, 15 N. Y. 532 (1855); Sill v. 
Corning, ib. 549, and the cases cited below. The original statement of the established 
view is J. Iredell's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. Today it is as impossible to 
make the orthodox lawyer believe that courts have ever set aside statutes on other than 
strictly constitutional grounds as it is to make an orthodox Jew eat pork. 
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1854, whereby the Married Women's Property Act of 1848 was 
confined, in the case of existing marriages, to acquisitions of property 
subsequent to the passage of the act, and its even more notable 
decision in Wynehamer v. the People/9 whereby the Anti-Liquor 
Act of 1855 was set aside, were both based exclusively on the "due 
process of law" clause, which was thus rendered an independent 
limitation on substantive legislation. 
By the Civil Wat, then, the doctrine of Vested Rights had been 
brought in New York within the fold of the written constitution 
and so placed beyond the criticism of the most meticulous. Its bene-
fits, on the other hand, were still confined to a relatively narrow 
range of rights: to an owner's valuable control of his tangible prolh 
erty ;fi0 to s&vitudes and easements approximating to a right of own-
ership ;u to litigated claims redeemable in money ;H to accrued rights 
of action,58 and to the rights protected by the "obligation of con-
tracts" clause of the United States Constitution.H Since the addi-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, however, the scope of rights protected by the "due process" 
clause, not only. of the Amendment itself but of any constitution 
in which the clause occurs, has been tremendously expanded by the 
action of the courts in undertaking to construe the term "liberty".u 
For there can be no doubt' that anterior to the .Civil War 
and for some years after it, "liberty" meant only such freedom of 
action as the ordinary law allowed and was subject, therefore, to 
curtailment substantially at legislative· discretion. 58 The later doc-
trine, which was the outcome of debates in Congress on the rights 
of the ·freedmen- immediately following the War, was first fore-
shadowed judically in the dissenting opinions of Jus.tices Fmr,n~nd 
BRADr,tv in the Slaughter House Cases57 in 1873. Ten years later 
the two justices had an opportunity to reiterate their view in concur-
ring opinions in the case of The Butcher's Union Co. v. The Cres-
"An interesting exception to this statement is, however, afforded by J. Cowen's 
opinion in Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill 324 ('%841). 
"See my articles in the Harv. I,aw Rev., XXIV, 366 ff. and 46o ff. 
" 12 N. Y. 202 • 
.. 13 ib. 378. 
00 See e. g. the Anti· Liquor Act cases. 
a See the Married Women's :Property Act cases., 
0 No. 42. 
a Nos. 2, 3, 32, 70, 88. Contra: C. J. Savage in People v. Livingston, 6 Wend. 
526, 530·1 (1831). The established view is well stated in 86 App. Div. 335 (1903). 
.. V d. infra. And see generally my article cited in note 41, supra. "=•• See my article in Mich. I.aw Rev., VII, 643 ff. 
H The reference is note 41, supra. See also the argument of counsel on both sides 
in People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 168 (1855). 
GT 16 WaIL 36. 
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cent City Co.,~8 and from this plane it was lifted two years later, by 
the New York Court of Appeals, into the full dignity of established 
doctrine, in the case of In re Jacobs.~9 But not till twelve years later 
was the new doctrine accepted by the United States Supreme Court. 
This occurred in the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 60 in which the 
spokesman of the Court was Justice PECKHAM, who had been a· 
member of the bench that decided In re Jacobs, and.its fellow, Peo-
ple v. Marx.61 
Dash v. Van Kleeck, Wynehamer v. The People, and fore Jacobs 
mark, then, the principal stages by which the doctrine of Vested 
Rights was expanded in New York to the modem concept of D~e 
Pi:ocess of I;aw; the obverse of which is the pn;sent-day judicial 
theory of the Police Power. Within this field, moreover, the New 
York courts were doing constructive, if not entirely original, work, 
and their results, modified to some extent by contributions from other 
jurisdictions, have today become the most important part of the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the country. Indeed, from the point 
of view of the primary aim of constitutional law, that of delimiting 
the rightful inter£ erence of government with private rights, they 
comprise constitutional law. 
And this signifies that the statistical phase of the matter, to wµich 
we now tum for a moment, should also illus~rate like developments 
in other jurisdictions. The statistics showing the influence of Dash 
v. Van Kleeck and the principles therein enunciated are imperfect 
until we come to consider those more specialized p9wers of the state~ 
Taxation and Eminent Domain, as we shall do immediately. Even 
so, of the twenty-four decisions which, before I855, overturned or 
curtailed legislative acts not thus classifiable and which were rend-
ered without reference to the federal ·Constitution, one-half followed 
in the wake of this case.62 On the other hand, the effect of the 
tra.nsference of the doctrine of Vested Rights from its somewhat 
precarious footing on the theory of the social compact to the "due 
process" clause is not at once so apparent. Thus, in the course of 
the thirty years between Westervelt v. Gregg and In re Jacobs only 
A III U. S. 746. 
u93 N. Y. 98. 
eo 165 U. S. 578. 
u 99 N. Y. 377. 
82 See note 44, supra. 
ea Those invoking the clause are Nos. 48, SI~ 54, n, 78, 120. Those which omit 
mention of the clause are 70, 88, Ior, u4, 148. It would seem that the period fcillowing 
the Dred Scott Decision and the bitter criticism which it evoked was a period of judicial 
modesty. See, e. g. the words of J. Wright in Met. Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. 
Y. 657, 668, criticizing certain "inconsiderate 4icta" in the Wynehamer decision and 
warning against setting "the judicial power above the legislative." 
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eleven decisions assert the paramountcy of vested rights to the legis-
lative measures involved, and five of these do so without reference 
to the ·constitutional provision.63 But, in all these cases save one 
the act is set entirely aside, whereas in eleven of the twelve 
or thirteen cases based on Dash v. Van Kleeck, the act was 
merely denied what was termed "retroactive" operation. The de-
cision in the Jacobs case, however, introduces a new epoch in judicial 
review in New York; and in the twenty years between that case 
and Wright v. Hart,64 forty-seven decisions overturned nearly as 
many acts on the basis of the "due process" clause,il5 while one other 
set aside the statute in review as "oppressive,''66 and yet another 
strangely invokaj. the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constil;u-
tion.67 Such is the stimulus of a new point of view! 
IV. THE DOC'l'RINE OB' VESTED RIGHTS IN RELATION TO EMINENT 
DOMAIN AND TAXATION. 
This concludes the story of. the development of constitutional 
limitations on general legislative power in New York, except for 
those limitations that attach themselves to the federal Constitution. 
But as I have already indicated, the full effect of the doctrine of 
Vested Rights is to be appreciated only by canvassing also the 
restrictions that have been built up, partly by judicial decision,. partly 
by specific constitutional provision, about the powers of taxation and 
eminent domain. 
Interestingly enough, the constitution of I777 contained no men-
tion of eminent domain. In the case of Gardner v. Newburgh,68 
however, which was decided in I8I6, C4ancellor ~NT held that the· 
state possessed the power as an incident of sovereignty but that its· 
exercise was governed by two fundamental limitations: first, that 
private properly could be thus appropriated for a "public purpose 
only," and secondly, that the owner must receive full cop:ipensation. 
The requirement of "just compensation" was soon after ,embodied in. 
the constitution of I82r,' from which it has since-been' transferred 
successively to the constitutions of I846 and r8g4 ;69 ·while in en-
.. 182 N. Y. 330 (1905). 
11 In the following cases vested rights are involved: •Nos. 158•, 159, 176, 182, 185•, 
~·~~~~~~~·~~~~~~-ill 
these Nos. 263, 266, 286 and 328 assert the right to a reasonable remedy where property 
rights are involved; see 128 N. Y. 190. In the following cases, the derived definition 
of "h"berty'' furnishes the basis of the -decision: Nos. 160, ~61, 174. 217, 241, 249, 274, 
28~1 , 290, 294, 295, 299, 300, 309, 310, 3II, 315, 317, 319, 320, 325, 326, 329, 334, 335· 
'""No. 283. 
ftNo. 267. . 
18 2 Johns. Ch. 162. 
9 Art. I, § 6, which is largely taken from Amendment V of the federal constitution. 
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forcement of it there had occurred, within the period considered in 
this article, twenty-two decisions involving twenty different en-
actments.70 The same constitutional clause, moreover, stipulates 
for a "public use" of the property thus taken. Even so, th!! question 
still remained whether this was a judicially enforceable limitation, 
whether, in other words, the judiciary was entitled to oppose its test 
of a "public use" to that of the legi_slature. The implication of 
Gardner v. Newburgh, carrying with it the great weight of KENT'S 
authority, was plainly affirmative, as was also that of the oft-quoted 
maxim-dating at least from CoKE-that "property cannot be taken 
from A and given to B without A's consent."71 Nevertheless, in the 
earliest case in which the investiture of a railroad corporation with 
the power of eminent domain was assailed before the courts, the 
court manifested great reluctance to concede the presence of a 
constitutional issue.72 But this attitude did not long endure. In 
later cases the building of railroads, albeit by private corporations, 
was pronounced a "public purpose," but because the furnishing of 
transportation was traditionally a public function ;73 while in Albany 
Street Matter, n which was decided in 1834, an act was set aside 
which gave a municipal corporation the power, in opening a street, 
to acquire the whole of an owner's lot, though only part of it was 
required for the street, and to apply the remainder to private uses.75 
Thus was judicial review clearly established in this class of cases on 
extra-constitutional foundations; while in Taylor v. Porter,16 de-
cided by Justice BRONSON in 1843, the doctrine was transferred tQ 
the "due process" clause; and altogether eleven cases have first and 
last vindicated the judicial view of "public use" against the legislative 
Yiew.77 Meantime, there had been inserted in the constitution of 
1846 certain requirements for the ascertainment of compensation 
in eminent domain cases, which are repeated in the constitution of 
1894 and upon which tWelve decisions overturning acts have been 
based.78 Later still, in consequence of the development of a similar 
doctrine in the ease of special assessments, the courts have laid down 
the requirement that before private property can be appropriated by 
the state the owner is entitled to a notice and a hearing. This doc-
' 0 Nos. 4, rs•, 28, 45, 46, 47, 56, 79, 109•, 139, 159, 164, 193, 204, 206, 207, 242, 255, 
261, 276, 298, 313. 
n This maxim was invoked by a Massachusetts magistrate in the 17th century against 
a town vote, see present writer in Mich. Law Rev., IX, 105. 
'12 Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 3 Paige 45 (1831). 
n Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (1837), is the leading case. 
"rr Wend. 148. Sec also Nos. 13 and I4- In all this class of cases the "A to B" 
maxim plays an important part. • 
'"Amendments have at various times been offered to the constitution to give munici· 
palities the power denied by the decision in Albany St. matter, but always without avail. 
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trine, which is asserted in four comparatively recent cases, is referred' 
to the "due process" clause.7 D 
The taxing power came within the radius of the doctrine of 
Vested Rights, both in New York and elsewhere, at a comparatively 
late date. This is partly due to the fact, no doubt, that it was 
precisely for th~ purpose of raising revenue that legislatures were 
first called into existence, and that consequently an unhampered 
legislative discretion in this field of power was very ancient. As 
Chief Justice MARSHAI.I, put it in McCulloch v. Maryland,80 "The 
power to tax involves the power to destroy,"-words which have 
frequently arrested the judicial arm. Furthermore, the power to 
tax is ordinarily granted the state legislature without other specifica-
tion, so that the written constitution does not furnish convenient 
pegs upon which to hang newly elaborated doctrine, as in the case 
of the eminent domain power. The result is that the taxing power 
remains to this day a power little amenable to judicial construction.81 
None the less, there are two principles \vith which the legislature 
must comply in New York if its 'tax measures are to survive judicial 
scrutiny. The first is the today widely accept~d, though rarely en-
force~ doctrine, which has been carried over from the law governing 
eminent domain, that a tax must be for a "public purpose." When 
the Court of Appeals was first confronted with this doctrine in 1856 
it flatly rejected it.82 But twenty years later, in Weismer v. Doug-. 
las, 88 which involved an act authorizing a village to issue bonds for 
the benefit of a private manufacturing concern, the court reconsid-
ered its earlier position; and altogether eight cases .in which enact-
ments were set aside have invoked more or less directly the "public 
p)lrpose" doctrine in the perio!l we are investigating.M Today,_ how-· 
Te 4 Hill 140, in which an act providing for the laying out of a private road was 
disallowed. The power thus denied the legislature was specifically granted in the con•" 
stitution of 1846, art. I, I 7. 
tt Nos. n, 13, 14, 17, 22, 31, 91, 128, 139, 157, 195. See note 74, supra. 
,. Nos. 40, 43, 68, 100, n9, 130, 142, 184b, 207•, 233, 268, 270. Art. I, § 7 of 
both constitutions . 
., Nos. ,1S3, 195, 219, 285 • 
., 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). ' 
01 Observe the court's floundering in McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904). 
12 In Guilford v. the Supervisors of Chenango C'ty, 13 N. Y. 143. See also dicta in 
Thomas v. I,eland, 24 Wend. 65 (1840), and Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446 (1857)." 
See also the cases cited in note 45, supra, from the same volume and from IS N. Y. 
In these cases the legislature's discretion in taxation is stated to be that of Parliament. 
83 64 N. Y. 92 (1876). Kent's theory of taxation was the quid pro quo theory, 2 
Comms. 332. From this theory the doctrine of Public Purpose is a logical deduction, 
foi;,Jt the party paying the tax is to get his due retnrn it must be as a member of the 
pub?ic. The quid pro qua theory is also adopted by the court in Gordon v. Carnes, 
47 N. Y. 6o8 (1872). and Wilson v. N. Y., 4 J;:. D. Smith 675 (1855). 
"'Nos. 90, 125•, 238, 26o and 280 are directly to the point. In Nos. n3, 133, and 134, 
acts compelling the issuance of bonds to create a bonus for railway companies were 
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ever, the doctrine is practically nugatory. For it had never proved 
effective except to check gratuities by local governments, and these 
are now specifically forbidden by the constitution of 1894.85 
The otner principle to which I ref erred above as governing the 
taxing power in New York is the principle first laid down in Stuarl 
'v. Palmer,86 that, in connection with special assessments, notice and 
an opportunity to be heard are essential to "due process of law."81 
This requirement invalidated acts in seven cases within our 
period. 8s 811 
V. NEW YORK COURTS AND THE FEDERAL CONSTIT:UTION. 
Finally, we should consider briefly a group of decisions resting in 
whole or in part upon some clause of the federal Constitution or 
upon the supremacy of federal law. Leaving out of account the 
cases in which the final clauses of the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were brought to the support of the "due process" 
clause of the state constitution, there were, in the period here under 
overturned: the state cannot make contracts for the individual In No, 125 a municipal 
tax is restricted to the locality. 
15 See note 40, supra. 
88 74 N. Y. 183 (1878). 
11 An earlier difficulty encountered in the case of special assessments was that they 
violated the principle that a tax must be "a public tax upon principles of just equality," 
J. Barculo in People ex rel. Post v. Brooklyn, 6 Barb. 209 (1849), citing 2 Kent's 
Comms. 332. The learned judge proceeds to argue that either the benefit from such 
assessments is public or it is not. In the latter case they are not 'taxes, in the former 
the public sbould bear the burden. The assessment in review is- accordingly set aside 
as violative of the "due process" clause, and an earlier case, Livingston v. the Mayor, 
8 Wend. 85, is overruled. Barculo's decision is in tum overruled in People ex rel 
:Griffin v. Brpoklyn, 4 .N. Y. 419 (1851); and in Guilford v Cornell, 18 Barb. 615, it is 
asserted that the "due process" clause has no application to the taxing power. 
15 Nos. 136, 167, 188•, 191, 192, 223, 269•. 
19 The doctrine that the legislature may not delegate its power, which was first 
launched as a judicially enforceable principle of constitutional law in 1847, in the case 
of 'some local option laws (see Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479, and Parker v. Comm., 6 Pa. 
St. 507). has never had any great influence in New York. It was first brought forward 
in this jurisdiction in connection with the Free School Act of 1849, which by its own 
terms was to become "a law" upon its approval· by the people at, a general election. 
In Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 68o (1851), the act was none the less sustained by J. 
Johnson, who expressed an uncomplimentary 'Opinion of the Delaware and Pennsylvania 
decisions above cited. But in succeeding cases, listed supra as Nos. 34. 39 and 41, the 
School Act was pronounced void on the basis of the new doctrine-new, that is, as a con· 
stitutional restriction. A tittle later the same principle was again invoked successfully 
in People ex rel. McSpedon v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349 (1856), where was overturned 
an act providing for the submission of certain charter provisions to the voters of New 
York City. A referendum of such measures to the municipal authorities is today pro· 
vided for by the constitution itself, art. XII, I 2. In recent years the ~cw York 
courts have had no difficulty in sustaining legislative delegations of broadly discretionary 
powers to administrative bodies. See especia!IY, Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. 107 (1866) 
and Trustees v. Saratoga Gas, etc. Co., 191 N. Y. 123 (1908). 
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survey, fifty-five such cases, to-wit: twenty-three cases invoking the 
"obligation of contracts" clause ;90 thirteen cases invoking the "com-
merce" clause ;91 six cases condemning ex post facto acts ;92 four 
cases in which the act involved was held to infract the admiralty 
jurisdiction of the United States ;93 two cases in which the treaty 
or commercial rights of Indians were held to have been invaded,9' 
and four cases in which the treaty rights of aliens were sustained 
as against conflicting legislation ;95 two cases involving tax measures, 
one of which was held void as constituting a tax on imports,06 under 
the principle established in Brown v. Maryland,91 and the other of 
which was set aside for taxing the shares of national banks,98 con-
trary to the rule laid down in McCitlloch v. Maryland and Weston 
v. Charleston;99 and lastly, one case concerning the rendition of 
fugitive slaves,100 and one concerning the rendition of fugitives from 
justice.101 
In interpreting the "obligation of contracts" clause the New York 
courts have never had any trouble making it a supplemental basis 
for the doctrine of Vested Riglits. Indeed the way to this consum-
mation was early pointed out by the federal Supreme Court itself. 
Thus in Fletcher v. Peck,1°2 in which the protection of the clause is 
extended in the most unwarrantable fashion to public land grants, 
MARSHAL!, made -a bold attempt to grapple the whole doctrine of 
Vested Rights to the federal Constitution; and in the Dartmouth 
College case,1°3 in which corporation franchises were accorded the 
same protection, a still more impalpable logic· prevails.10' Many 
of the New York decisions, accordingly, in which enactments are 
disallowed under this clause, are easily classified by reference to 
federal precedents. A single early case105 is based squarely on 
Fletcher v. Peck, which, however, is also cited in cases where it does 
00 See notes 102·n6, infra. 
01 See notes u7·26, infra. 
"Nos. 61, 64 and 65, involving the same act; Nos. 67, 173, 288 • 
.. Nos. 87, 92, 102, 121. 
"' Nos. 63, 210 • 
.. Nos. 216•, 217, 277•, 296• • 
.. No. 81 • 
.. 12 Wheat. 419 (1827). 
oaNo. 108. 
• 2 Pet. 449 (1829). The disability of the state with respect to national bank shares 
is largely removed by § 5219 of the Revised Statutes, in which connection sec Van 
Allen v. the Assessors, 3 Wall. · 573. 
100 No. 14-
101No. no. 
,.._.. 6 Cr. 87 (1810). 
1D1 4 Wheat. 518 (1819). 
10. I have dealt with the subject at length in a study not yet published. 
1"'No. 6. 
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not furnish the principal ground of the dec~sion ;108 three compara-
tively recent cases107 illustrate the rule established by the Dartmouth 
College case; three early cases directly invoke the principle upheld 
in Sturges v. Crowninshield,108 in which the original intention of the 
clause finds expression ; three other cases reiterate the rule estab-
lished in Bronson v. Kinzie,1°9 that the law of remedy under which 
they are made constitutes a part of the obligation of private con-
tracts; and two more enforce the extension of this rule in Von 
Hoffman v. Quincy110 to the case of municipal bonds. On the other 
hand, in a number of decisions the New York courts have felt free 
to take a line of their own in applying this clause. Thus, in three 
of the cases in which the Married Women's Property Act was re-
stricted to subsequent acquisitions of property in the case of existing 
marriages, the proposition was advanced that marriage is a contract 
within the meaning of the federal Constitution ;111 again, in another 
case a license to sell liquors is treated as a contract ;112 while in two 
others an award of damages-in one case, a judgment for breach 
of contract-is treated is a contra,.ct.1111 None of these positions is 
today tenable, nor would they probably be so regarded by the Court 
of Appeals. And questionable are two other decisions in this field, 
both comparatively recent. In the' earlier ope11& it was held by the 
Supreme Court that, where property was taken for a public use on 
certain conditions, the legislature could not abrogate these. In the 
100 See especially Kent's argument in Gardner v; Newburgh, cited supra, where it 
is suggested that the federal case supports the proposition that the power of eminent 
domain may be exercised for a "public purpose only." The argument is further elabo· 
rated in 2 Kent's Comms. 340. See also the statement by Chancellor Walworth in 
Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 371, that Fletcher v. Peck protects "rights vested 
under executed contracts" I In other words, the "obligation" clause is made to do the 
work later cast on the "due process" clause. 
• 01 Nos. 176, 267, 270. 
108 4 \Vheat 117 (1819). The New York cases are Nos. s, 8, is. 
100 I How. 319 (1840), followed in New York by the decisions in Nos. 25, 57, 181. 
11• 4 Wall. 535. The New York cases are Nos. 103 and 150. 
111 Nos. 27, 33•, 44- A ·dictum of Story's in his concurring opinion in the Dartmouth 
College case supports the idea, which is decisively rejected in Maynard v. Hill, 125 
u. s. 190. . 
112 No. n. 
112 Nos. 7S a~d 208. In the latter case, an award of damages made by a city with 
statutory authority is stated to have the effect of a judgment and to constitute a con• 
tract the obligation of which is impaired by an act materially abridging the means of 
its enforcement. In Dash v. Van Kleeck the theory is developed by J. Spencer that, 
immediately a judgment is rendered against a party, "there then * * * arises a contract 
against the party adjudged to the sum of money in favor of him to whom it is awar\led." 
From this it follows that a legislative act annulling a judgment is void under art. I, § to 
of the federal constitution, which thus supports the principle of the Separation of Powers 
in forbidding legislative interferences with judicial decrees. 7 Johns. 477,' 489. 
11• No. t84-
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later one, 115 it was held by the Appellate Division that an act pro-
hibiting the disposal of garbage by specified methods in the borough 
of Brooklyn was invalid as to an existing corporation carrying on 
this business under a contract with the city, in a way that did not 
constitute a nuisance.116 
But while the New York courts have shown a somewhat exces-
sive zeal, perhaps, in pressing the "obligation of contracts" clause 
as a restriction Q11 the legislative power of the state, this is not at 
all the case with their application of the "commerce" clause. In-
deed, it was not till 1875 that a local court ever set aside a New York 
statute as transgressing this clause, though the federal Supreme 
Court had before this date set several of them aside.111 Nor is the 
explanation far to seek. It is to be found in New York City's com-
mercial situation in relation to the rest of the country and the 
peculiar local problems to which this frequently gave rise.118 For 
this reason the New York courts 'W'ere reluctant for many years to 
recognize the dogma of the excl}lsiveness of Cong;ress' power under 
this clause, with the result that their decisions were more than once 
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Following Hender-
son v. New Y ork,119 however, three statutes were promptly set aside 
by New York courts as trespassing on power reserved to Congress.120 
But even more pronounced was the effect of the federal Court's: 
decision in Leisy v. H arden,121 which for the first time applied the 
"original packag_e" doctrine in the field of interstate commerce. 
Between 1893 and 1905, seven decisiOns setting aside four acts were 
based on this precedent,122 which, it may be surmised, was the more 
favorably regarded because of the support it lent the new-found· 
doctrine of Liberty.128 Meantime, however, in Plumley v. Massa-
chusetts,m the federal Supreme Court had virtually abandoned the, 
logic of its earlier decision, the benefits of which it now became 
:111No. 283•. 
:111 Ct Buffalo East Side R. Co. v. Buffalo St. R. Co. tu N. Y. 132 (1888); Manigault 
v. Springs, 195 u. s. 473 (1905); and Hudson Water Co. V• McCarter, 209 u. s. 349, 357. 
ur C."bbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), with which compare Kent's decision in 
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (1812); the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (1849), 
with which compare New York v. ;Miln, u Pet. 102 (1837); and Henderson v. N. Y., 
92 u. s. 259 (1875). 
:111 Particularly the problem of disposing of hordes of immigrants, especially in the 
days before federal inspection had been sufficiently developed. 
:ut See note u7, supra. 
... See Nos. 122, 143, 147, 187. The last two involve the same act. 
,. ~ 135 u. s. 100 (1890). 
'122Nos. 199, 218•, z48; and 277, 278, 308, 327, all involving the same act. 
ua No. 248 bears out this suggestion. See also Nos. 241 and 291 in the same con· 
nection. 
"' 155 U. S. 461 (1894). 
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anxious to confine to dealers in liquor and cigarettes. Following the 
new clue, the New York Court of Appeals in 1905, in. the case of 
People ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg,1~3 upheld an act forbidding the 
sale during the closed season of certain game birds even when im-
ported into the state from abroad, and was sustained, on appeal, 
by the United States Supreme Court.126 It, therefore, appears that 
a comparatively liberal formula has today been arrived at for adjust-
ing the claims of the state's police power as against the exclusive 
power of Congress under the "commen;e" clause, and that this 
formula has been finally accepted by the local courts. St!ll more 
recently the Court of Appeals has shown itself prepared to ratify 
a similar adiustmentobetween the contesting claims of the police 
power and the doctrine of Liberty that attaches to the "due 
process" clause.121 
* * * * * * * * 
From !840 on, judicial review became a considerable factor of 
constitutional government in New York. From that date· till the 
Civil War there were probably more statutes invalidated in New 
York on constitutional grounds than in all the other states 'of the 
Unioh combined. J3ut the great extension of judicial review in New 
Yark, as in other states, has taken place since 1870. This has been 
due, first, to the increase in the legi~lative product; secondly, to the 
greater detail of state constitutional provisions goveming.legisla:tive 
power; thirdly, to the d~velopment of constitutional doctrine. 
Those features of constitutional doctrine which have been most 
material in bringing about the extension of judicial review in New 
Yark may be summarized thus: 
l. The principal assumption underlying the construction which 
the New York courts have made bf the written constitution of 
the state is that of the completeness of this document and, there-
fore, of the exclusiveness of its provisions with reference to any 
matter with which it specifically deals. By this assumption-for it 
is hardly an explicit dogma-the differentiation of constitutional pro-
visions from statutory enactments has been maintained, and the 
prerogative of the people in amending the constitution has been up-
held against the clainis of Legislative Sovereignty. 
2. A secondary and more or less corollary doctrine which the 
New Yark courts, in common with the courts of other jurisdic-
tions, have manipulated-though, agaill, more by implication than 
HS 184 N. Y. 126. 
""2U U. S. 31 (1908). 
= See especially the recent cases of People v. the Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 
121, and Heim v. McCall, ib. 629. 
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by explicit assertion of it-is the doctrine that any constitutional 
office carries with it certain intrinsic functions and a certain in-
trinsic discretion in the discharge of these functions. Reinforced by 
a particular interpretation of the doctrine of the Separation of 
Powers, this doctrine has supported judicial independence against 
Legislative Sovereignty, and has kept the power of appointment from 
slipping into the hands of the legislature.128 
3. But the heart and soul of constitutional limitations in New 
York, thanks especially to Chancellor KENT, has been the doctrine of 
Vested Rights. The first deposit of this doctrine was that principle 
of statutory construction which forbids any "retroaction" of statutes, 
that is, any operation disturbing property rigltts. Disguised as an in-
terpretation of the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the doctrine of 
Vested Rights also early ruled out, except in carefully defined cases, 
special legislation dealing with the vested rights of named parties. 
Again, it is the doctrine of Vested Rights which, in. the more definite 
form of the ancient gnome that "Property may not be taken from A 
and given to B without A's consent," that underlies the doctrine of 
Public Purpose, both as a limitation on the eminent domain power 
and-in which relation it was established at a comparatively late 
date---on the taxing power. 
4. The New York courts also did constructive work of an im-. 
portant character in utilizing the "due process of law" clause as 
a safe vehicle for the doctrine of Vested Rights.129 The initial 
motive of this step was to meet the criticism of those who 
held that the will of the legislature should prevail unless in 
contravention of the written constitution: its final result has been 
the entire transformation of constitutional law in some of its most 
important phases. For once the "due process" clause was applied 
to substantive legislation of a general character, the term "liberty" 
in it became eventually drawn into construction, as well as the term 
"property," and the outcome of this development, in connection with 
which New York's courts again playeq a leading and decisive role, 
was a tremendous and well-nigh revolutionary extension of judicial 
review. 
5. But if judicial review has been extended to new and im-
portant fields, it has, by the same token, been liberalized. Before 
the Civil War, judicial review was governed, in New York as else-
where, by the general theory that certain kinds of legislative action 
us See Nos. 7, 58•, 171, 176, 240, 275, 333. 
''•=In Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183 (1878), the "due process" clause is charac· 
terized as "the most important guaranty of personal rights to be found in the federal 
or state constitution. .It is," the court continues, "a limitation upon arbitrary. power 
and is a guaranty against arbitrary legislation." 
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were prohibited absolutely and that certain other kinds-taxation, 
for instance-were allowed absolutely.180 Today constitutional limi-
tations upon state power, when it does not invade the field of national 
power, are qualified more and more by a general allowllnce for the 
"police power,'' with the result that they tend to dissolve and merge 
into· the judicial view of the "reas.onable" requirements of the 
case.1a1 
The extension of judicial review in New York must be deemed. 
to have taken place, not only by popular allowance, but with pop-
ular approval. In all the changes that have been made since the 
beginning in New York's constitutional arrangements, few attempts 
have been made till a very recent date to curtail judicial review or 
to set aside or "modify any of its doctrines.182 On the contrary, 
new provisions have ::igain and again been added to the constitution 
which were designed to restrict legislative power and which the 
courts were relied upon to enforce. · · 
Most important among. such provisions are certain ones, w:hich 
like Article III, § § I6 and IS, have for their purpose, not the curtail-
ment of legislative discretion in the choice and development of pub-
lic policies, but the rendering impossible of certain legislative mal-· 
practices, like log-rolling in its various forms. In ·no other field can 
judicial review perform a greater service than in the rigorous en-
forcement of such provisions; and it may be suggested that,· with 
the growing tendency on the part of courts to abandon the imprac-
ticable notion of fundamental and indefeasible rights of "liberty" 
and "property," local judicial review will become confin~d to the per-
formance of this modest but most useful task. Meantime, two re-
forms should be instituted in the practice of local judicial review: 
the prompt and sure appeal of all constitutional cases for final de-
cision by the highest state court, and the intervention of the attomey-
general in ,all such cases. · 
As in the parallel ,case of the Confessional, judicial review has 
from the first be~n manipulated by two schools, the Laxists and 
100 See my article cited in note 4r, supra. 
111 For a broad definition of the Police Power in relation to the "due process" 
clause, see J. Andrews' opinion in Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, with which com· 
pare J. Werner's decision in the Ives case, 201 N. Y. 271. In the latter case the court 
plays tricks with its own logic. It starts out by defining the Police Power as extending 
to the promotion of "the general welfire," but presently drops this term out, and then 
sets aside the act before it as not a real health measure I 'Compare also People v. Ber· 
berrich, 20 Barb. 224 (1855) and Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657 
(1866), where the Police Power is broadly defined, with the Wynehamer case, r3 N. Y. 
378 (1856), and Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64 (1866), where the emphasis is on private 
rights. The rise and development of what may be called the Doctrine 'of the Police 
Power before the Civil War I have investigated in another study not yet published. 
132 See notes 75 and 76, supra. The doctrine of the Ives case has since been virtually 
disallowed, so far as the state constitution is concerned, by a recent amendment. 
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the Rigorists. New York judges have often been in the fore 
rank of the latter school. Yet even in New York "laxism" is today 
winning out-if slowly, yet surely. And this signifies that the time 
is at hand when, even in this conservative jurisdiction, point of view 
will be more potent than precedent in fixing the judicial application 
of constitutional restrictions. 
EDWARD s. CoR.WIN. 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
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1855: 49 Kundo!f v. Thalheimer, ib. 5931 [see 3s]. 
so People v. Carroll, 3 Park Crim. 2:z, [I8so, ch. I39l· 
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Cooper, 22 N. Y. 671 same year, [1860, ch. I87l; 
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matter of James de Vaucene, ib. 289, [1866, ch. s78]; 
78 People v. Krushaw, ib. 344 note, [see 77]; 
79 Morgan v. King, 3S N. Y. 4S4. [18so, ch. 264]. 
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83 People ex rel Brown v. Blake, 49 Barb. g, [t866, ch, 214], 
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